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ABSTRACT

The efficacy of self-study by governing boards in higher education was examined, along with other approaches to board evaluation. Data were obtained from self-study efforts of the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges' (AGB). The following criteria were used: institutional mission and policy, institutional planning, physical plant, financial support and management, board membership, board organization, board/chief executive relations, and board/faculty relations. The efficacy of self-evaluation was evaluated by studying trustee responses to an AGB evaluation instrument. Of concern was whether trustees tended to rate their board's performance differently or similarly on the eight criteria. For each criterion, the extent to which trustee assessments varied across 61 institutions was also examined. It is concluded that too often trustees bypass the stages of organizational conceptualization and definitions of performance and move directly to evaluation. There is little effort to articulate a common or dominant view of the college as an organization. Included are 15 references. (SW)

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Evaluating Boards of Trustees: In Theory and In Practice

by

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This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Higher Education held at the Sheraton Inner Harbor Hotel in Baltimore, Maryland, November 21-24, 1987. This paper was reviewed by ASHE and was judged to be of high quality and of interest to others concerned with the research of higher education. It has therefore been selected to be included in the ERIC collection of ASHE conference papers.

Introduction

College and university governing boards enjoy a considerable measure of autonomy. With some exceptions, most notably among statewide boards (Berdahl, 1987), boards of trustees are formally accountable only to themselves as long as they act in accordance with the law and their own bylaws. As sovereign bodies, boards are under no mandate to conduct a self-assessment or to have their performance reviewed by external evaluators. And, in fact, many do not.

Yet colleges and universities depend on their environments for a wide range of resources. If a board appears to be above evaluation and beyond criticism, public opinion could turn against the board and result in a loss of confidence in the trustees and a loss of support for the institution. Moreover, it is politically difficult, perhaps even untenable, for a board to insist that faculty, staff, and students be answerable for their actions when they grant themselves immunity from accountability.

For these reasons boards are often advised to undertake periodically some form of self-assessment usually based upon guidelines determined by the board. Otherwise, the board should "expect to be continually on the defensive, meeting each skirmish by improvisation or reliance on available financial or political power" (Zwingle and Mayville, 1974, p. 18). In a typical assessment process each trustee confidentially completes a questionnaire or checklist that solicits their opinions about the board's performance in key areas of responsibility. The resulting data then form the basis of a self-study process conducted by the board often with the assistance of an outside facilitator.

The purpose of this paper is (1) to examine the efficacy of self-study by governing boards, and (2) to explore other approaches to board evaluation.

I. The Efficacy of Self-Study

Data Source

Over the past ten years, the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB) has offered a Board-Mentor Service to its member institutions. The Mentor program includes a one- or two-day self-study retreat conducted by an experienced trustee, trained as a facilitator by AGB. Prior to the retreat, each board member completes a self-study instrument (Association of Governing Boards, 1986) which includes both open and closed-end questions concerning the trustees' perceptions of the board's performance on a series of criteria. Possible assessments of each criterion include "very good," "good," "barely adequate," "poor," and "don't know." Criteria of interest in the present research included:

1. Institutional mission and policy. The board's responsibility to ensure that the mission is clearly defined and stated so that students will know the institution's purposes and objectives, faculty will know how to direct their efforts, and the institution's publics will know what they are supporting.

2. Institutional planning. The board's involvement in the planning process and their commitment to ensuring that plans are used to guide decision making.

3. Physical plant. The board's responsibility to create and maintain a physical environment that is conducive to learning and consistent with reasonable expectations of future funds and enrollment trends.

4. Financial support and management. The board's responsibility to ensure that sufficient financial resources are made available to the institution and that assets are managed prudently.

5. Board membership. The board's responsibility to ensure that trustees have the skills, knowledge, and background necessary for effective governance and that members serve the interests of the institution as a whole rather than those of any special interest groups.

6. Board organization. The board's responsibility to ensure that its structure serves its purposes, that policies and procedures are updated as necessary, that the committee structure functions well, and that lines of communication to constituents are kept open.

7. Board/chief executive relations. The board's responsibility to select a chief executive, to define his or her responsibilities, to give the chief executive necessary freedom of action, and to help ensure a productive board/CEO working relationship.

8. Board/faculty relations. The board's responsibility to ensure that their relations with the faculty contribute to the institution's academic success and that the faculty has sufficiently delegated authority to carry out educational policies and procedures.

In all, self-study information was available on sixty-one colleges and universities, classified as follows:

	Number	Percentage
Doctoral and Research Universities		
Public	5	8.2
Independent	1	1.6
Comprehensive Colleges and Universities		
Public	3	4.9
Independent	15	24.6
Liberal Arts Colleges		
Independent	27	44.3

	Number	Percentage
Two-Year Colleges		
Public	2	3.3
Independent	2	3.3
Specialized		
Independent	6	9.8
Total	61	100.0

Data Analysis

We sought to examine the efficacy of self-evaluation by studying trustee responses to the AGB instrument. Specifically, we were interested in determining whether the trustees of individual institutions tended to rate their board's performance differently or similarly on the eight aforementioned criteria. In so doing, we could reach conclusions about the extent to which trustees distinguish among the criteria when they evaluate their board's performance. This is a significant issue because, if board performance is truly a multidimensional construct, and the criteria offered are relatively independent of one another, trustees should rate some areas of performance higher than others. Otherwise, at the extreme, a single criterion could be used to capture trustees' assessment of board performance.

Second, for each criterion, we wished to examine the extent to which trustee assessments vary across the sixty-one institution sample. Our goal in this instance was to determine whether board members of different institutions rate their boards' performance differently. In so doing, we wished to speculate about the ability of the instrument to differentiate among boards. If such variation were not found it would suggest that the

instrument (or the self-evaluation process) is inadequate as a means to assess performance, since there is ample evidence that board performance does in fact vary from institution to institution (Taylor, 1987).

For purposes of comparing responses to the instrument, a point value was assigned to each possible response. Values included:

Very Good - 5

Good - 4

Barely Adequate - 3

Poor - 2

Don't know or no response - 1 (This value was recorded but was not used in calculating mean responses.)

Individual Institutional Responses

Table 1 shows observed variation among the mean scores assigned by board members to each of the eight criteria of interest in the study. Specifically, the spread between the highest and lowest mean score was examined and boards were grouped into ranges of spread.

Table 1

Spread of Scores	Number of Boards	% of Total Sample
.25-.50	13	21.3
.51-.75	22	36.1
.76-1.00	15	24.6
1.01-1.25	9	14.8
1.26-1.50	1	1.6
1.51-1.75	1	1.6
Total	61	100.0

These results suggest considerable consistency among trustees' perceptions of their board's performance on the eight criteria. In fact, in 82% of the institutions, the spread from lowest to highest mean score board members assigned to each criterion is one or less. In other words, for example, the range from lowest to highest score assigned by the vast majority of boards to the eight criteria is less than or equal to the difference between "good" and "very good" or "barely adequate" and "good."

Interinstitutional Comparisons

Table 2 shows observed variation in the total mean responses by board members to the eight criteria studied. The total mean response for each board was calculated by multiplying the value of the response (2 through 5) to each criterion by the number of trustees who selected that response and then dividing that value by the total number of responses. As such, this is a summary value of each board's assessment of its overall performance.

Table 2

Total Mean Response	Number of Boards	% of Total Sample
4.50-4.75	1	1.6
4.25-4.49	12	19.7
4.00-4.24	23	37.7
3.75-3.99	17	29.9
3.50-3.74	5	8.2
3.25-3.49	2	3.3
3.00-3.24	1	1.6
Total	61	100.0

These results suggest that the sixty-one boards are relatively consistent in their overall assessments of their board's performance. Eighty-five percent of the boards rate their overall performance as at least 3.75 but less than 4.50, a range of .75. This indicates that the vast majority of boards believe their overall performance is slightly less to somewhat better than "good."

None of the boards rate their overall performance as "poor" and none as "very good." This finding is actually to be expected. In order for a board's overall rating to be "very good" or "poor" all board members would have to rate the board as such on all of the eight criteria. That such unanimity is not found here is not surprising.

Slightly more variation is seen when criteria are examined individually. Table 3 displays for each of the eight criteria the number and percentage of boards whose self-ratings fell within given response categories. Overall, the response pattern tends to be fairly consistent across criteria. For example, with the exception of criterion seven, Board/Chief Executive Relations, the range 4.00 to 4.24 is the modal response category for all criteria. That is, for all criteria but one, more boards rate their performance as good or slightly better than good than select any other performance category.

Table 3

Criteria

Response Categories	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
4.50-4.75	1	1.6	1	1.6	4	6.6	8	13.1	3	4.9	4	6.6	19	31.1	3	4.9
4.25-4.49	13	21.3	7	1.5	7	11.5	14	23.0	13	21.3	14	23.0	17	13.1	10	16.4
4.00-4.24	23	37.7	19	31.1	22	36.1	18	29.1	18	29.1	25	41.0	9	14.8	19	31.1
3.75-3.99	12	19.7	12	19.7	10	16.4	10	16.4	12	19.7	6	9.8	8	13.1	14	23.0
3.50-3.74	7	11.5	15	24.6	12	19.7	9	14.8	7	11.5	8	13.1	6	9.8	10	16.4
3.25-3.49	3	4.9	4	6.6	2	3.3	1	1.6	3	4.9	2	3.3	0	0	2	3.3
3.00-3.24	2	3.3	2	3.3	1	1.6	1	1.6	0	0	0	0	2	3.3	1	1.6
Less than 3.00	0	0	0	0	2	3.3	0	0	1	1.6	2	3.3	0	0	1	1.6
No response	0	0	1	1.6	1	1.6	0	0	4	6.6	0	0	0	0	1	1.6
Overall mean	3.98		3.88		3.93		3.93		4.10		4.02		4.23		3.97	

Not unexpectedly, then, mean responses for all of the criteria are similar, ranging from 3.97 to 4.23, a spread of .75. When criterion seven, Board/Chief Executive Relations, is omitted, the spread drops to just .22. Moreover, for each criterion but number seven the vast majority of self-ratings fall into the 3.50 to 4.49 range, signifying that most boards rate their performance on all criteria as slightly worse than "good" to slightly better than "good." In the special case of criterion seven, the modal range is 4.50 to 4.75, which verges on "very good." Far fewer responses fall into the categories below "good."

Comments on the Analysis

These results indicate, both for individual institutions and for the sample as a whole, that responses to the self-assessment instrument vary only modestly. First, as was shown in Table 1, the spread of scores from the lowest to the highest criterion is narrow for most boards. That is, most boards perceive only slight differences in their performance across criteria. A board which rates one criterion "very good" is unlikely to rate another "poor."

Similarly, both overall and for individual criteria, the sixty-one boards studied are similar in their self-assessments. Ratings tend to hover around "good," with relatively few boards describing their performance on any single criterion as "poor," "barely adequate," or "very good." Board/Chief Executive Relations presents an exception. The president is usually crucial to the decision to undertake a Board-Mentor program, in the first place. It is unlikely that a chief executive whose relationship with the board is tenuous would suggest this means of self-assessment. Furthermore, trustees are repeatedly counseled that their primary role is the appointment, support, and, when necessary, removal of the president (Taylor, 1987). For a board to rate itself lower than "good" on this criterion could be seen as tantamount to calling for the president's resignation--an unlikely prospect on the eve of a board retreat.

The relative lack of variation in this study may also relate to the self-assessment categories offered to trustees who complete the instrument. Only four categories are offered, and nuances between categories cannot be captured. In particular, the difference at the visceral level between

"good" and "barely adequate" seems great. That many trustees lean toward "good" in this instance does not seem surprising.

Limitations and Future Analyses

Because the unit of analysis of interest here is the board, variations in responses among members of a given board may have been obscured. Such variations within individual boards will be calculated and quantified in later stages of this research, but it is worth noting that visual inspection of the data revealed a pattern consistent with the results reported here. That is, most trustee responses by a given board on a given criterion tended to be similar. Extreme variations in trustee perceptions of a board's performance within any one criterion were observed rarely if at all.

This is in no sense a random sample of boards. It is a self-selected group of AGB members which includes a disproportionate number of four-year, independent college boards. The Board-Mentor program requires a significant investment of time and money which in itself may deter weaker, less dedicated boards. Boards which undertake this form of self-assessment and agree to a retreat would be expected to be more aware of their responsibilities than boards which choose not to participate. This may explain the generally positive self-appraisal.

On the other hand, it can be argued that boards favorably disposed to self-examination might also incline to be more self-confident and thus more self-critical. Several research studies have questioned the validity of self-evaluations when linked directly to rewards such as compensation and promotion (Meyer, 1975). Under those circumstances self-evaluations tend to be far more generous than supervisory assessments. Since there are no

extrinsic rewards at stake for trustees, one might expect the responses to be somewhat more self-critical.

Finally, it is important to note that the completion of the self-study instrument is only a small part of the Board-Mentor process. It serves as a source of information for the Mentor and as a "consciousness-raising" exercise for participating trustees. The instrument's limitations, if any, are not an indictment of the self-assessment process.

II. Alternative Approaches to Evaluation

Quite understandably, self-study has been the most popular approach to the evaluation of board performance. Not insignificantly, self-studies are economically feasible and relatively simple to administer. Moreover, as an internal exercise focused on the formative (rather than summative) aspects of board assessment, the approach poses few risks to the board as a whole or to individual trustees, especially since the judgments rendered are typically rather tepid.

Whether or not to rely on self-studies as the sole or primary means of board evaluation depends, we believe, less on questions of feasibility and "safety" and more on the board's conceptualization of the organization. As Goodman and Pennings (1980, p. 191) observed, "the conceptualization of organizational effectiveness must be preceded by an explicit conceptualization of the organization. Each of the organizational perspectives leads to different definitions of organizational effectiveness." The same proposition holds for definitions of board performance.

When trustees, therefore, judge a board's performance to be "very good" or "barely adequate," the appraisal rests on some notions, usually assumed and occasionally expressed, about the nature of the college or university the board governs. In other words, views of a board's performance are largely and properly an outgrowth of views of the college as an organization. Thus, before a board establishes criteria for success or undertakes an evaluation of its performance, the trustees should consider explicitly the most salient traits of the organization and the implications of that analysis for definitions of performance and approaches to evaluation. We shall describe briefly five common models of organizations and discuss the significance of each concept for board assessment.

Organized Anarchy

Cohen and March's (1974) description of the university as an organized anarchy suggests how difficult it can be to define the purposes and judge the effectiveness of institutions of higher education. The organized anarchy is characterized by problematic goals, unclear technology, fluid participation, and ad hoc decisions. That is, the organization cannot define a consistent set of goals; many goals are inferred from actions and retroactively rationalized. Because the organization is uncertain about how to accomplish those goals it has succeeded in defining, it often operates by trial and error. Participants to the process come and go at will, depending in part on what other issues prove attractive. Decisions occur more on a haphazard than systematic basis.

Only slightly overstated, the organization's purposes are whatever individual participants believe them to be. As a result, success or

effectiveness becomes very nearly synonymous with individual satisfaction with the organization and with one's role within the organization. Under these conditions, evaluation, almost by necessity, must take the form of self-assessment.

In an organized anarchy trustees, like other organizational participants, might be characterized as organizational affiliates. Affiliation suggests a loose, non-exclusive relationship with the organization in which no participant is powerful or knowledgeable enough to force the others to accept and work toward the attainment of a particular set of goals.

In essence trustees in an organized anarchy do not occupy the pinnacle of a hierarchy where they identify goals and ensure their achievement. Rather, trustees are participants in a tournament whose players, rules, strategies, and standards of victory are undefined, ill-defined, or constantly changing. The foremost intended outcome in the organized anarchy is participant satisfaction. Hence, the key question for each trustee, as distinct from the board, is "Am I satisfied?" Since individual trustees must make that judgment for themselves, self-study seems entirely appropriate.

The Mechanistic Organization

In stark contrast to the organized anarchy stands the mechanistic or bureaucratic view of organizations. Early theorists like Taylor (1911) and Weber (1947) perceived the organization as a strict hierarchy arranged to promote efficient production. Workers were assumed to be motivated essentially by economic rewards. Management's task was to provide detailed

instructions, procedures, and work rules and to exercise close control over work activities. Mechanistic organizations have strong traditions and precedents which afford little discretion. In a mechanistic organization optimal functioning is constrained only by the mental and physical limitations of workers or by the poor application of management principles. Further, these theories assume that the owner's (or board's) goals guide the organizations activities. Effective performance is defined as the achievement of these goals. Evaluation entails a formal review by the board or owners of organizational performance. The key question is, "Did we meet the goals and targets established by senior management and the board of directors?" The answer must be determined by the board and not, as with an organized anarchy, by individual trustees. An affirmative answer would confirm that the board has performed satisfactorily.

The mechanistic view rests on simplifying assumptions about human motivation and managerial influence. The view also assumes that the organization is comparatively unrestrained by environmental factors. Trustees of mechanistic organizations will probably assume the role of owners whose control, through management, of the organization's activities is nearly absolute.

The Humanistic Organization

The humanistic view of the organization assigns owners or the board the ultimate right to set organizational goals but opens the goal-setting process to include managers and employees. Guided by the concept of organizational development, humanistic theories (McGregor 1957) presume that employees are not machines, and that it may be good management, good human

relations, or both, to include employees in some aspects of goal setting and evaluation. Moreover, some proponents of the humanistic view would argue, the board really has no choice in the matter. People, not organizations, set goals. If the organization's operational goals are set even partially outside the board room, then organizational theories that presume owners or trustees to be in complete control are inadequate.

One approach to goal setting and evaluation in the humanistic view is management by objectives (MBO). Here a board cooperates with executives to set goals. Managers then work with employees to determine specific group or individual objectives through which these goals will be realized. At the end of a particular MBO cycle, managers and the board assess organizational performance by considering the employees' collective success at meeting their mutually developed objectives. The key question is, "Have we achieved our mutual goals?" As with bureaucratic organizations, the board utilizes a "congruence framework" (Gardner, 1977) which compares performance with previously stated standards, goals, and objectives. If the organization attains these goals, then by extension the board has performed well.

In humanistic organizations the board functions, in effect, as a monitor, responsible as much for orchestrating the contributions of other constituents as for determining organizational goals. Like the mechanistic organization, however, the humanistic organization assumes that the organization is largely unconstrained by environmental forces.

The Political Organization

Some observers of higher education question the degree to which governing boards can set operational goals in such professionally dominated,

constituent oriented organizations. The board of a university, for example, is usually not equipped to set educational goals without collaborating with the professors who perform the institution's central activities. The fact that many colleges tend to be oriented toward external constituencies (e.g. legislatures, markets, alumni, accrediting bodies) further complicates the matter and offers some justification for what might be termed the political model of organizations.

In the political model the organization represents an arena in which various internal and external interest groups compete to set the organization's goals (Baldridge, 1971; Pennings and Goodman, 1977). Not only do interest groups negotiate the organization's goals, but they also select the criteria by which performance will be assessed. Thus, political models define successful performance as satisfying the needs and expectations of dominant interest groups. The key question is, "Are the dominant groups or power holders satisfied?" This is a question only they can answer directly.

Under this model assessing a board's performance would require identifying critical constituencies, coalitions, or dominant interest groups and ascertaining the extent of their satisfaction with the board's performance. Under the supervision of a neutral third party, the board might survey key stakeholders on questions related to the board's efforts and results. Frequently, and perhaps unfortunately, the goals of critical constituencies can be in conflict and, as a consequence, a board's performance could simultaneously be judged excellent and inadequate.

In the political model, trustees individually or collectively function as partisans themselves who coalesce or compete with other interest groups

to set the organization's goals and to define effectiveness. In theory at least, the board should enjoy some advantages as a competing entity. The power of each interest group to influence goal formation is a function of the group's ability to cope with organizational uncertainty, the group's centrality to organizational functioning, and the degree to which the group's contributions can be replaced by other groups (Thompson, 1967; Zammuto, 1982). Board access to extensive information about the organization, which may be withheld from its "competition," should assist trustees to cope with organizational uncertainty. As the college's legal authority and traditional bridge to the environment, the board is often central to organizational functioning. And, as an entity whose formal responsibilities are unduplicated by other groups, the board's contributions cannot be readily replaced by other groups. That comparable claims can be made for other interest groups, including professional employees, external resource suppliers, accrediting agencies, and governmental bodies, explains why trustee hegemony in the organizational arena may be contested. It also helps explain why almost no boards evaluate their performance by systematically polling or questioning other constituents.

The Resource Dependent Organization

Political models often do not differentiate between the claims of internal and external constituents in the selection of organizational goals. Resource dependence theory moves a step further claiming that resources, which come largely from the external environment, are the key to prosperity and survival. Inasmuch as an effective organization is by definition one which attracts sufficient resources from its environment, it follows that

the board's performance should be based chiefly upon whether it enables the college or university to acquire the necessary resources.

Evaluation may focus on the measurement of results, effects, and performance (Gardner, 1977). Both financial measures such as salary levels, market share, and endowment performance as well as non-financial measures such as quality of faculty and institutional reputation may be relevant. How much any one "resource" represents success is troublesome unless one accepts organizational survival as the ultimate test.

Trustees in the resource dependence scheme may be considered intermediaries between the organization and its environment. The organization can influence resource suppliers in two ways, both relevant to the intermediary's role. First, the board can attempt to influence the external criteria by which resources are allocated, for example, by lobbying for tax support or for favorable legal treatment. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) note that such political activities are means by which organizations attempt to create a "negotiated environment." As both legal representatives of the college and often as prominent citizens, trustees may play a crucial role in organizational attempts to influence environmental conditions.

Second, trustees can attempt to change the college's internal character in order to make the institution more attractive to resource suppliers. This tactic, defined as "adaptive" by Chaffee (1984) commonly involves efforts to offer new programs and services, thereby loosening the college's dependence on the current range of resource suppliers. Pfeffer and Salancik argue that "organizations are controlled by an external source to the extent that they rely on that source for a large proportion of input or output. Dependence diminishes through diversification." Trustees may be involved in

efforts to diversify, either by requesting that the organization develop new activities or by approving new activities recommended by other critical constituencies.

A board's latitude to change a college or its environment is hardly absolute. Smaller schools in particular are highly constrained in their ability to modify their environments and internal conditions at most colleges, shaped as they are by law, history, tradition, and economic realities may be equally resistant to changes. Any evaluation of a board, under the resource dependent model, would takes these constraints into account.

The board's role, then, is an intermediary with limited influence. The key question is, "Has the board enabled the college to attract sufficient resources?" The judges are the resource suppliers whose decisions are conveyed through their actions.

Summary and Conclusion

To summarize, we have argued in this section of the paper that the organizational perspective one assumes conditions definitions of board performance which, in turn, has implications for the selection of an appropriate evaluation methodology. Table I summarizes the different types of organizations, definitions of board performance, approaches to evaluation, and board roles.

Too often trustees bypass the stages of organizational conceptualization and definitions of performance and move directly to evaluation. There is little effort to articulate a common or dominant view of the college as an organization. In such cases, the board could easily

adopt an approach to evaluation ill-suited to the nature of the organization or its conceptualization of board effectiveness. The evaluative data could be misleading or, worse, even wrong.

There are several difficulties, which should be noted, in applying this approach to board assessment. First, colleges and universities, especially the more complex ones, do not always fit neatly into a single category; many combine elements of the several models which are not entirely mutually exclusive. It might be expected, therefore, that some board members will, perhaps quite properly, resist efforts to pigeon-hole the college in a single classification. Second, it is not easy and some would argue not desirable to separate board performance from organizational performance. Indeed, with the organized anarchy model excepted, all four other models gauge the board's performance based upon the degree to which the institution has achieved goals, satisfied constituencies, or attracted resources. Nevertheless, we believe the board's role in these efforts can be examined and evaluated, preferably by an appropriate methodology.

Organizational Typology For Assessing Board Performance

	Organizational Anarchy	Mechanistic	Humanistic	Political	Resource Dependent
Views of Organization					
Whose goals is the organization trying to satisfy?	Individuals	Board of trustees	Board and management in consultation	Dominant interest group(s)	Critical resource suppliers
Definitions of Performance					
Intended outcomes	Individual satisfaction	Achieving board goals	Achieving goals negotiated with management	Satisfying dominant interest groups	Acquire sufficient resources
Key question	Am I satisfied as a trustee?	Have board's goals been attained?	Have organization's goals been attained?	Are the dominant groups satisfied?	Are our resources sufficient?
Methods of Evaluation					
Approaches	Informal self-assessment	Formal board review	Management by objectives/ goal attainment	Surveying satisfaction of dominant interest group(s)	Monitor trends in resource acquisition
Judges	Individual trustees	Board of trustees	Board and management	Dominant interest group(s)	Critical resource suppliers
Framework	Professional judgment	Congruence	Congruence	Professional judgment	Measurement
Dominant Board Role	Affiliate	Owner	Monitor	Partisan	Intermediary
Constraints on Board	Substantial?	Few	Few	Substantial	Substantial

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